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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Tuition la of general interest for three reaeons.
First, in times like the present, particularly those of the
past few years, there has been much discussion as to the
feasibility of charging the patrons of the eohoole tuition.
Second, with the extending of the free public schools be
yond the eighth grade, there has been some question if the
high school should be included in the free publlo school
system.

Third, some states having the ealea tax with which

to help eupport schools allot the money to high schools by
paying the tuition of non-resident students.
With the decline of tax reoeipte due to tax delin
quencies and laws reducing the amount that might be levied,
it was seriously considered by many that tuition should be
charged to enable the school to continue to render high
class service.

In some instances, the sohool Boards took

the initiative and set tuition rates for their own resident
etudents.

In a few states, the legislatures passed laws en

abling the School Boards to charge tuition.

This charge

was not for speoial courses or the like, but for the privi
lege of attending school.

School districts that did not,

or could not, support schools fought the payment of tuition
to other districts where the children of their district
attended school.
Shile much of this was due to the fact that it was
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difficult or Impossible to pay, there was also an Ideal of
the American school system at stake*

The question was, how

free was the free public school system of America!
With the high school, some have felt that tuition
could be charged as it was not included in the range of
free public schools.

Where the state legislature has set

the amount of tuition that should be paid, there was con
flict with the schools that maintained a higher standard
than the average.

This, of course, led to a demand for the

patrons to pay the difference.

Such a demand was naturally

contrary to the principles of free public education.
Reeldene© is of importance for the reason that where
tuition Is charged, it is based upon residence.

In general,

it may toe said that the free public schools are free only
for those who reside in the district.

The main object, then,

is to establish the principles that determine residence.
Purpose
The purpose of this study will be to examine the
Supreme Court cases of the different states that deal with
residence and tuition.

The principles established by these

cases will be set up and illustrated by court cases.
The purpose of this study has five aspects, namely;
(1) To examine the court cases to determine the status of
residence of parents.

(3) To examine the court oases to

determine the residence of homeless children.

(3) To ex

amine the court cnees to determine the payment of tuition

toy resident students.

(4) to e r m i n e the court oases to

determine the payment of tuition toy non-resident students,

(5) To examine Idle constitutionality of tuition laws.
Statement of the Problem
The Superintendent, the Principal, and the school Beard
must know the principles that establish a student as a resi
dent cr non-resident.

They

must know when tuition can toe

charged, from whom collected, end how much may to© charged.
The problem of this study is focused upon setting up
the principles that the Supreme Courts of the various states
have established to these ends*
Sources of Bata
The material for this thesis was obtained by going
to the descriptive word dictionary and finding the division
and key to look for.

Then the Corpus Juris was examined to

form a basis for the study.

The Century Digest end the

second and third Decennial Digests were examined for cases
pertaining to the subject and listed.

In addition to this,

the Current Digests up to 1935 were examined for the same
purpose.

This list of cases was then read in the various

sectional court reports and briefed and filed.
Delimitations
This study is limited to the study of State Supreme
Court oases dealing with residence and tuition.
of the State Statutes will be made.

So study

Sc attempt will be made

to establish the law on residence and tuition.

The study

Hill be limited to » report of the findings of the different
State Supreme Court® on residence and tuition.
Method of Study
First, a list of oases m e
listed above {Sources of Data).

compiled from the source®
These oases were then read

and briefed from the various sectional court reports.

The

briefs were then grouped and arranged according to the prin
ciples they illustrated, and from this basis the thesis m e
written.
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CHAPTER 2

RKSIBSKQI FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES
. the public schools of a state
are, in general, open to children, otherwise eligible, who
are bona fide residents,

the test for this proof of resi

dence should be ordinary indicia of residence or absence.
It may be assumed, with evidence not to the contrary, that
the baste for residence has been made in good faith.

Spec

ulation as to the secret mental intentions of persons shall
not enter into the evidence.

In other words, the inten

tions ae stated by witnesses without direct evidence to the
contrary shall be as given.
Residence for school purposes in based primarily up
on the purpose that person has for being in the district,
A person moving into a district for the purpose of taking
advantage of the schools of the district will be held to be
a non-resident.

A person in the district for the purpose

of having a home is a resident.

Parente moving to a dis

trict to work end make their domicile there are residents,
»%ch case must rest upon th© merits of the care.1
Seeldence of.State Officials.

Residence for school

purposes does not have to be a legal domicile, that is,
th© test for residence for school purposes is not the earns
as for suffrage, in fact, it is possible to vote ore place
iQrosland v 7 School District N o . 4 0 (1904) 91 Minne
sota 266, 97 K. W. 885.

’
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and have school residence in another.’ The governor and
superintendent of public instruction in Uebraska lived in
the state eapitol, Lincoln* during the term* of their of
fice.
state.

Their legal voting residence was elsewhere in the
They applied for admittance to tha Lincoln city

schools for their children cs resident students.

The Board

of Education held that they wore non-resident students.
Thera was no doubt that the relation between the parents
and children was parental and permanent.

The famine* had

not moved to Lincoln for the purpose of taking advantage
of the educational facilities, that was evident.

Tt was

held by the Board of Education that the legal residence of
the families being elsewhere, they could not gain residence
in Lincoln for school purposes.

The court held that *a

family having legal custody and control of children end
move for purposes other than for school privileges, the ohil' -v,/4‘
dren are entitled to free tuition even though their legal
residence is elsewhere.1*
**,£g.?&sX££}\$&.

In Changing domiciles

and establishing a new domicile, two things art indispens
able .3

First, a residence in a new location, and second,

the intention to stay there.

To change residence and to

reside at this? residence over a period of a year or even
more would not in itself constitute n change of residence.
%ick©y v. Selleck (1906) 76 Beb., 747, 107 H. W. 1033.
. fOardaer v. Board of Education of City of Fargo,
(I860) 8 Oak., 259, 38 H. W. 933.
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The intent m m % be, m

far a© the parties know, to st&y at

the new residence ana not have plana os: knowledge of a fur
ther change,

The fact that the stay in the new residence

would be long enough to establish a voting residence would
not in itself establish a residence for school purposes.
Mr, Gardner,4
with his family,

& farmer, moved to Fargo ©very winter

hart of his household goods were taken

along and the family

lived in a rented house,

hired to take care of the farm.

A man was

The issue was to determine

which place was the true domicile or home, the house in
the city or the farm.

It w m held that #the more,tangible

domiciliary acts have the greater weight la determining
the true domicile»w

In this case, It was decided that the

far® was considered the home and that Gardner was a non
resident.
M £ L M ^ f e -la...££qgxal T e r r i f y .

A federal official

is, on the other hand, not & resident of any district,
being a federal employee and living in federal territory,
he is not a resident of any school district.

The point In

law that he hag not moved for the purpose of taking advan
tage of any educational facilities has no bearing on the
case..

The rules governing the validity of a residence fox

school purposes in this case 'have no standing.

It is im

possible to set up a school residence while living in fed-

4 Ibid.
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eral territory, even though the school district surrounds
the territory.

A federal territory 1 b under the direct su

pervision of the federal government and the states are r5thout authority.

The schools c-f r state are set np toy the

etrte authorlty for the resident* of that state of echool
age.

However, a federal employs* does not lose residence

by >-oving to » federal ter'ltory.

For instance, he nay con

tinue to vote in hie former legal residence.

Therefore,

if ho has had legal residence in the state in which the
federal territory is located, he c m
Otherwise, M s

claim free tuition.5

children m e t pay tuition.
Generally sneak

ing, children whose parents are not residents of a school
district are not permitted to attend school in that dis
trict.

When they are permitted to attend, it is by per

missive state legislation.

Children placed temporarily

with relatives in one school district and with a father liv
ing in another school district are held legal residents of
the district their father resides in.®
dency failed on two points*

The test for resi

First, the relation between the

ohildren and the relatives was not parental and permanent,

second, they were placed with the relatives to take advan
tage of the educational facilities afforded.
A esse much the earn© but with a different angle was
^Rockwell v. Independent "SiSho'oF'Kistrict of Rapid
City, (1935) 48 9. D. 137
®Fangman v. Mayers (1931) 8 p. (3nd) 783.
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that of B o r d e w y k B o r d e r } b:, r resident of a school district
r.oved awry f row the dirt riot during the rchool year.
leaving, he placed tv child under the care of M o
giving hin full charge.

Upon

brother,

Tix evidence had to chow that the

uivclo wr,B *on loco parentis’' or the father would have to
pay tuition,

The evidence had to be accepted or prorented

e.r there could be no speculation as to the secret mental
Intentions of the father.

It could not be hold that the

girl had been brought to the district for educational ad
vantage a ar she had been a resident, for school purposes,

A child who has had school residence In a district
may be placed with a feuvlly in that district for the sole
purpose of having a hoi e with derivable Influences,
Where parents are divoroed or separated, the chil
dren can be left in the district where the parents had es
tablished residence.8 In this case, the parents were
separated and both moved away from the district.

One of

them continued to support the child in the old school
district and it was held that the child was still a resi
dent.

The guardianship, of course, had to be parental and

permanent,
Summary of Points in Law in Chapter 3
(1)

The teat for proof of residence should be ordi

nary indicia of residence or absence thereof.

(1932)

66 JP. 1

ipen'Hesi 'SoViCo'l disTrici '"§©
•

v. Bordewyk

l Reno Board of Education v. Hobbs, SO ®. K. 293
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(3)

Arrimgenents for the care of children must 1)0

judged by the vlmini fact*, not by the possible secret
mental Intentions.

(?)

TftTmr.n way not become rooldentr ltpon moving to

r dlntrlct for merely eduootlcvinl adVRutspeo.
(4)

Each care must b© determined by It© merits.

(5)

Residence for school purposes does not have to

be a logoi domicile,
(6)

Guardirnrhip to be valid eat«t be permanent and

parental.
(7)

To ofrr.nr® domiciles tro points are necessary}

First, residence in * near location.

Second, the intention

to stay there.
(8)

The more tangible domioilirry cote have the

greater value in determining the true domicile.
(9)

Domicile in ft federal territory does not es

tablish residence for school purposes.
(10) State employees moving for other purpose® than
for educational facilities cr«n establish residence for
school purposes.
(11) Children, have school residence in r. district
may remain tuition free under conditions 7 and C. in case
the perente move.
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CHAPTER 3
RESIDENCE OF HOMELESS CHILDREN
Homeless children are not necessarily orphan®.

By

homeless children I® meant those whose domiciles are not
with their parents.

This does not indicate that both of

the parents are necessary to maintain the home.
ent may maintain and keep the home.

Either par

In fact, residence for

school purposes ©an be maintained in one district and resi
dence in another

district.

Children deprived of a home

with their parents are entitled to a free education as well
as those living with parents.

The homeless children are a

responsibility of the state just as much as those in their
own established homes.

The purpose of the state in educa

tion is to furnish a free education to all resident chil
dren of the state.

It Is evident, then, that homeless chil

dren that can establish residence are just as entitled to a
free education as other resident children.

The purpose of

this chapter shall be to show how such residence has been
established.

In no case was it found that homeless chil

dren were held to be without residence.

The residence was

not necessarily in the district where the children were,
but residence was established some place and some one was
made responsible for their education.
As in all cases of residence, each caee had to stand
on its own merits.

In general, it might be said that those

children of school age, not confined to an institution of
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correction, normal In other respects, eligible under the
state laws as to age, etc., and able to establish residence,
were entitled to a ftee education.

The possible exception

were those oruhane placed in homes that included in their
purpose the education of the children in the home. This
was especially true where money was provided for that pur
pose.

The length of the residence In the district was

found to have no bearing on the case; the residence did not
have to be continuous, such a® during vacations.

If the

residence was established in good faith and not with the
purpose only of securing an education in the district, the
guardianship permanent and parental, the residence was
valid,

In short, each case mist be determined on its merits.
P i the q.Me.

?he legislature

of no state has tried to set up a rigid standard of rules to
determine residence.

The laws to be followed are general

principles established for the purpose of guidance.

The

angles of each case are different on some detail®.

While

they can b e , and are, the same in general, no fast and hard
rule can be followed entirely.
cause an injustice to be worked.

To do so would many times
The general principles

must be set up and each case decided on its own merit®.

For

example, the law may read that upon moving to a district the
father must work there to establish residence.

It is en

tirely possible that upon arrival the job may not be had for
a number of reasons.

According to a strict interpretation
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of the Till 0 , the father would not be able to establish resi
dence.

Basing the case on its merits, the point that would

of the father upon moving to

count would
the district.

While we have drawn the example from a case

of a child with a father, the principle is the same for all
cases.

Another point in determining a esse on its merits

is that the evidence should be accepted as oreseated with
no evidence to the contrary.

That is, the witnesses may be

assumed to be telling the truth when giving evidence.
There should be no speculation as to their secret mental in
tentions.
■

Evidence of witnesses may

be taken at its face value unless there is evidence to the
contrary.

When a witness ssys that a child has been placed

with him and that he is to have full control over the child
and to continue to have it, it may be assumed that is Just
the purpose the child ha® been placed with him.

If it is

maintained toy a parent that he can no longer support a
child and that the

child has been placed with

a family to

provide a home, it

must be accepted that that

was the

reason for placing

the child there.

that thechild

The fact

is placed in the school, that the school

is better than his

former residence, cannot be interpreted to mean that the
secret reason for the change was to take advantage of edu
cational facilities, and in so doing escape paying tuition.
The guardianship is parental and permanent if that is the
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stated fact in the case.
15 K 1 \ .

^ e r e homeless

children are placed In either homes or institutions it must
be shown thet the relation® are permanent end parental.
permanent» not any set time is meant.
a month, a year or more.
limit is not set.

By

The time may be for

The point is that a certain time

If the control is only while actually

staying at the place, such as during the school year or un
til a certain age is reached, the control is not considered
permanent.

The parental relation must be the same as that

of a parent. The guardianship must mean that they are re
sponsible for the well being of the child, that they must be
willing tofeed, clothe and educate the child.

To establish

this point, the support need not necessarily be one hundred
per cent,
A Hew York oaee* in 1908 establishes these point®.
An orphan boy by the name of Wisebauer was placed in a pri
vate hone by a children* s aid aooiety of Brooklyn.

This

society paid a regular sum to the family for hi® board and
also an additional sura for hie clothing.
ed 3uat as a member of the family.

The boy was treat

Ho arrangements were

made as to how long he was to stay with the family.
the boy wished to attend school

When

the School Board refused

him free tuition a® they held that he was not a resident of
1People v . ex re1 Brooklyn dbitdrens* Aid Society
(1908) 109 HYS 403.

15
the society’s district.
The court held that the boy m w as much & member of
the Place family as he could be of any family.
stood in parental relation to the boy.
control over him at all times.

Mrs. Place

$h© had complete

The boy had not been placed

in the Place family for the sol® purpose of getting an edu
cation but for the purpose of haring a home.
of Mrs. Place was not questioned.

was permanent and parental.
to free tuition.

The residence

Her relation to the boy

Therefore* the boy was entitled

The fact remains, however, that guardian

ship is not always permanent and parental, but may be penal
and temporary,
.Ifeiiiaaiftca.

»

Incorrigibles com

mitted to guardianship of a person does not quality them
for residency in a school district.

In the case of Black

v. G r aham^, an Incorrigible boy was c o m i t t e d to the guard
ianship of a resident of a school district in Pennsylvania,
The guardian wished to send him to the school in the dis
trict but the School Board denied the boy admission on the
grounds that he was not a resident.

The guardian held that as

he, the guardian, had residence, end the boy being under hie
care and control, residence was established.

The court

ruled, in this case, that the relation between the boy and
his guardian was penal and temporary, not permanent and
parental.

The purpose in this case was not to merely give

3Black v . G r a h a m 7 238 ha. 3*1,' 86 A,. 268.
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the boy an education but also to help him In other respects
m

well.

This fact, although true, did not make the re

lationship permanent end parental which wan necessary to eetabl I eh re 3 id.en.c0 .
In order to establish residence, it is not neoeesery
to have a guardian at all.

Children that have been emanci

pated nay establish their own residence if they ar© of
school age and otherwise eligible.
•

By emancipation

is meant those children who are free of any parental con
trol, making their own living, and are looking out for their
own interests successfully.

It la evident that children

capable of talcing car© of themoelvee, should be given an op
portunity for an education.

As they h?,ve no one to establish

their residence for them, it is necessary for them to estab
lish It thcnselvee.

That they may do this has been estab

lished by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
In the case of

J

E

^

a

l

a

l

»

a boy living in Wisconsin, living by himself, va® denied
fro© admission to the public schools of the city he was liv
ing in on the gonads that he w h s not a resident.
had no relatives in the district.
contributed to his support.

The boy

So institution of any kind

The boy worked and paid for hie

board and room in the district.

The court held that a child

emancipated and earning hie own living was © resident of the3
3Xidd v. Joint 3chool District Hoi. 3, 144 fisc. 35,

316 IfW 499.

J7

district and therefore entitled to attend the public aohools
without the payment of tuition,

attsAsfcm*..

J i L j a i a a u j J j a a s a .»

school districts are charged by the state by law to provide
free aohoole tor all residents of school age residing in the
district.

The question

charitable institutions

then whether or not the children in
are entitled to a free education

would be determined on the point of the children having resi
dence for school purpose*? in the school district.
Generally speaking, the institution is the residence
of the children living in them.
place of domicile.

They have no other home or

The institution stands in parental rela

tion to the children in the institution.

This being; the

case, the children In such homes are entitled to a free edu
cation from the schools

of that district, thatis, the dis

trict In which the home

is located.

Following the same

reasoning in the parental relationship the education is free
only in the resident district.

The institution cannot send

its children to & school outside of the home district and ex
pect a free education.
The fact that an institution does not pay taxes has no
bearing on the oase of residency.
this type do pay taxes.

In fact, very few homes of

The faot that the attendance of the

children of the home might work a hardship on the local dis
trict has no bearing on the oase.

It can easily be seen

that the attendance of a large number of pupils from a home
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could crowd a school "beyond It® capacity and prove to be a
drain on the finance® of the district.
guarded against.

In Michigan, this Is

There, the superintendent of public in

struction has the power to limit the number.4
the residency would be the m ,

The law on

however.

Residency in Hones Sstsblleled fo-T the Fur*-os? of
Education.

Some Institutions arc formed for the purpose of

oaring, supporting and educating homeless children.

Us

ually in ouch cause, money is provided for that purpose.
It was found in Mississippi that children in such institu
tions were non-residents for educational purposes and that
the home would have to pay the tuition to the local school
or provide its own educational facilities.
5
A home in Mississippi was founded for the ourpose
to support, care and educate homeless boys*

Two boys from

this home of school age were sent to the public school In
the district where the home was located.

The boys were re

fused admittance on the grounds that they were non-residents
of the school district* also that the home did not pay
tares and so were not members of the district.

The court

held that the boys were non-residents of the district for
school purposes.

The school had been founded partly for

the*purpose of educating its inmates.

The children had not

40hlld Welfare Society of™ Flint v V Kennedy School
District (1933) 230 Mich. 290, 189 N . W. 1003.
^^ake Farm v. District Board of Education, District
No, 3 (1914) 179 Mies. 171 148 K. f. 115.
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been brought in for the sole purpose of having a homo, but

for education ae well.

Money had been provided for thrt

purpose and they wore wait able to -'ey for ar education.

■>?n if they would have been without funds, their children
would have been non-realdenta.

The fact that the institu

tion paid not tares had no bearing on the case.

In the Supreme Oourt oaoeo examined, it was found that the
courts baned their decisions on residents for school pur
poses upon the same general principle# that were used to
determine the residence for school purposes of children w1.th
parent®,

Ufoen a child is pieced in n charitable Institution

It Is assumed that they have no other residence or domicile.
Children In such Institutions are under the control and care
of the institution and usually the time that they will be
there is indefinite.

Tinder ordinary conditions, the chil

dren remain in ouch homeo until they can oara for thenselves or until the responsibility is shifted to cone other
person or persona.

The very sene conditions aay he said to

exist in a home with parents.

It in not expected that the

children in a home are going to stay there Indefinitely.
'Sven though they should, the responsibility of the school,
district Is limited.

When children reach a certain age,

whether In a home or an Institution, the district is
charged with providing a free education only up to a certain
point.

With these points established, the residence of
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children for school purposes is established the same way,
on the saute points* whether in homes, with their parents,
or in charitable ho«tes, with the exceptions etated earlier*
Two Supreme Court oases from the states of Illinois
and lost Virginia, illustrate the points in mind.

Both

oases are recent ones and undoubtedly would be followed by
court decisions in other states.
. * *#*•

In the case of the M

for children made a contract with a local school district
to pay a part of the cost of sending its children to the
local school.

They agreed to continue to pay this sum even

if the home was taken into the school district upon the vote
of the people.

The people did later vote to take the home

into the district, whereupon the Grand Lodge decided to dis
continue the payment of the tuition.
The Board held that the Lodge was liable on two
counts, first, the contract with the Lodge, and second, the
fact that the children of the home were non-residents.

The

last point was based upon the assumption that the children
were in the home temporarily and so were not residents.
On the first count, the court held that the contract
m s void, as residents did not have to pay tuition.

The

fact that the children were not in the home for any set time

St„?koi
8, 110 8S 440.

$

W a t ) W W a ? *

did not aaJce them non-reel dents.

They were residents on

the following point*: the relation bett^een the home and the
children was permanent and parental, and the children had
not been brought into the district merely for educational
purposes, but to provide a home for them.
The Illinois o r b ©7 , a teacher of n Oovrnty eohoel was
instructed by her Board to refuse admittance to orphans
from an orphanage in the County without the payment of
tuition.

The refusal tree made because they held the orphans

to be without residence.

The Court held to the asms line

of reasoning as the one in west Virginia, namely, the chil
dren had not been brought into the district for the purpose
of eduoatlon, and the home was the only residence that the
children had.

In 1916, the Supreme Court of Illinois gave

a similar decision in the case of Ashley v...JBoard .cl^auc&UflR .OfilfiLfflfi . I l U a J f f l L J L M J a ja -

Wtfc these h o

cases

following each other, the point In law In the State of Illi
nois was well established.
The mere presence or residence in a charitable home
does not necessarily establish residency in that district.
If they are placed there by another district end supported
by that district, they are held to be residents of the sup
porting district,
ESTESES,, I n . Q f r ^ t 3 i & f c J g m B «

7hogoon v

Persons, because they

Jones (1934) 311 111. 425, 143 HE 66.

84419
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are paupers, must be supported from means other than their
cm.

Paupers of eohool age from a home dletrlot mist be

supported end furnished a free education by that district.
Paupers from another district are the liabilities of that
district.

In the case of the Sheldon V o q x JIo a w r y.^ .T o m _of

ii-jheldon8 . the paupers of a district including; those of a
school age were placed in the poor house of Sheldon,

The

Poor House sent those of school age to the city schools
where they were denied admittance.

The Court held that

they were residents of the district that supported then
«<nd charged that dletrlot with the responsibility of edu
cating then.

JA&s&mA . . i y ^ O ^ a d A f t g i f l f t a • Hones for
neglected of delinquent children, but not licensed by the
state, as such, do not have the arme standing as orphan-*
ages so licensed,

flnoh hones are usually privately run

and are not financed by public money.

In such homes, the

children are not entitled to free tuition, while those in
licensed homes are,

They may be in a district for the same

reason as children in licensed homes, but the dletrlot is
not liable for their education.
The same is true of children pineed in boarding homes.
Here * the educational. angle can plainly enter in.

The

boarding homes are very likely to be placed in such places

s3heldon Poor House vT Town of Sheldon (1900) 73 Vt.
130, 47 A 543.
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to take advantage of good educational facilities.

Those who

con afford such service for their children are apt to hear

in mind the educational advantages of a hose In choosing one.
The charitable hones that have been dealt with have
been of the licensed type.

A case Illustrating the turns

without a license Is that of the

rJXn!i,yti i

Wt.*'

1** this case, a homo

was organinert to care for delinquent or neglected children,

but was not entitled to a license,

When the children from

this home were sent to the school, they were refused admit
tance because of non~revidence.

In this esse, the Oourt

ruled that the children in a licensed how® were residents
of the district in which the home was located and so were
entitled to free tuition.

Those in turn-licenced homes were

not residents of the district, as such bo m m were
ity boarding homes.
parental.

in

real

The relationship was not permanent and

In view of such facts, the children of non-li-

ceneed home® are not entitled to free tuition.
The boarding house angle is explained by the cage of
itenefftUfl..Ba&r.d.jaf-£dno7.tlon..v^ atate Board of .Sduc,ptlan,AP
Hies Lillian Bnysdorf lived in Kies Towner’s boarding
house and expected to continue to live there.
lived in Hew York and supported her.

Her father

Lillian applied for

®Child Welfare ™Soelety of Flint v 7~Kennedy School
District (1932) 230 Mich. 390, 189 NW 1002.
10
..
Manafelld Board of Education v. State Beard of Ed
ucation. C1925) 101 *. J. 474 139 A 765.
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admission in the Hackett town school, the tuition to be paid
by the Mansfelld district where Kiss Towner was a qualified
resident,

The court ruled that Lillian was not a resident,

ae she had been brought in by a non-resident for advantagee
of education.

The relationship between Miss Towner and Lil

lian was not permanent or parental.

The father continued

to have control and could remove the girl at any time.

He

had also chosen the home with an education for his daughter
in mind.

The last fact disqualified her on the grounds that

she had been brought in for educational purposes.

The residence of children not living with either parent or
in any charitable Institution, or supported by their par
ents, has been well established.

The Supreme Courts of

Missouri, Kentucky, Illinois, Sew York, and Iowa, covering
a period of time from 1903 to 1933 have all handed down
decisions in harmony with each other.

The oases were based

on the same points in law as were other oases on residence.

That is, the oases were considered upon the individual
merits of each ease.

It was assumed that the witnesses

were not hiding any secret mental intentions.

The actual

appearance of the case, suoh as living with a relative, and
to all appearances a member of the family, plus the testi
mony counted heavily.

The purpose of these oases was to

prove residence in the families of the persons with whom
children were living.
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The Missouri courts have held that where It le the
policy of the state to furnish free public schools for all
children of school age the statutes relating to schools
should be liberally construed.11

In this case of Halbert

v* Olymer, the father of the child made an oral agreement
with hie own father to let him have the grandchild and care
for him.

At times, the child would visit his father for a

short time.

Also, he would visit different places in the

country such as any child with the opportunity might do.
The father contributed nothing to the support of his son,
the grandfather assuming all care.

In deciding that the

boy wae a resident, the court ruled that for all purposes,
the boy was a member of the grandfather*e family.

As hie

grandfather’s residence wae not questioned, the boy’s resi
dence was established.

The Court held that the State

Statutes being liberally constructed, the boy was for all
praetieal purposes a resident of the district, although his
domicil© might still be with his father.

It has already

been pointed out in Chapter Tiro that it is possible to have
a residence for school purposes, even though the domicile
is elsewhere.
The tame point on realdenoe is also illustrated by
19
the Stanford School District v. Powell.
Here, the mother

^ S t a t e @x rel Halbert v. Clyraer (1913) 164 Mo. App
671, 147 3W 1119.
^ S t a n f o r d School District v. Powell (1911) 145 K y .
95, 140 SW 67.
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of a fir® year old girl died.
and

wae

Her father was a day laborer

unable to support or provide a home for her.

Thie

being the case, he gave her up to his sister, who promised
to care and provide for the girl.

When old enough, the

girl applied for admittance to the public school but was
denied admittance as a non-resident,

the court held that

the girl*« home was with her aunt and so was entitled to the
school privileges of the district in which her aunt was a
resident.
Both of these cases also contain the point that they
did ;\ot live in the district merely for the purpose of at
tending school but made their homes there.13

Both oases

have the point of the xfilatlonahlp. being permanent and
parental.14

The eligibility of a child for the privileges

of a school district is not restricted to the domicile of
the parent, but the actual residence of the child.

A

Worth Dakota case bring® thie point out clearly.15

A

mother deserted by her husband placed her daughter with a
sister.

The mother moved out of the state to South Dakota

and lived and worked there.
aunt.

The d o u b t e r remained with her

During vacations aha often went to her grandmother* s

where she would work, but always returned to her aunt.
The Worth Dakota statute® state “that schools of
13Or«nd Lodge v. Board of Education of Elkins (1933)
90 ft. V © 8
p e o p l e v. Hendrickson (1908) 109 WTS 403.
15Andereon v. Breithe&rth (1933) 345 BW 483
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the state shall at all times he equally free, open and
accessible to all children over sir and under twenty-one
years of age, residing in the district*.

The court held

that the residence of the child is not restrioted to the
domicile of the parent hut in e broader sense, means the
actual residence of the child.
When a child is taken into a home to he oared for in
good faith, the right to attend public school does not de
pend upon the legal residence of the child, hut whether or
not they are a resident

of

the district in which they wish

to attend school.13
The eon of William Saxe resided outside the bound
aries of School District Bo. 36.

His

con stayed with hie

grandmother, who lived in District Bo. 36.

The grandmother

was to oare for him and educate him at her own expense.
The father evidently was able to support the boy.

It was

held by the Board the arrangement was made merely to avoid
payment of tuition.

The court held that the arrangement

was made in good faith, in which case the residency of the
boy was established in District Bo. 36.

The point that

the secret mental intentions should not be considered was
used in this case.
Temporary residence in a

16Peopl® v, School District Ho. 36 (1917) 306 111.
App 381
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school district is not sufficient to establish residence for
school purposes.

The reeidenoe is considered temporary even

though the stay is of some length.
v. F o s t e r .*7

In the oaae of

inches ter

Foster is a resident and tar payer in the city

of Winoheeter and brought suit to permit his nleoe to attend
the city schoole of Winchester without the payment of tui
tion.

Foster had agreed to support, clothe and maintain his

niece until she was twenty-one years of age.

The girl was

for several years under twenty-one, so the arrangement would
last for some time, but the point in law is that it was not
permanent.
The Court found that the girl was not a bona fide res
ident.

The uncle was not her guardian, she was not appren

ticed to him and be had no control over hey.

He was only

responsible while the girl wae with the family.

The relation

was not permanent and parental.
Minors

my

have residence for school purposes other

than the domicile of their parents.

The test for uuob resi

dence is not the same aa that for s u f f r a g e . T h e test is
whether the arrangement 2ms been made in good faith, if the
ohlld has been brought in for educational purposes* and if
the relationship is permanent and parental.
<1*%
"»
ni
Board of Education of Winchester v, Foster (1903)
116 KY.484, 76 3fS45
18Mt. Rope School District v, Hendrickson (1916) 197
Iowa 191, 197KW47
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Summary of Points in Law of Chanter 3
(1)

Each case must be determined on its individual

(2)

A child emancipated and earning its own living

merits.

is entitled to residence*
(3)

Children living in licensed homes are residents

of the district the home Is
(4)

located in.

Children living in hones that have as part of

their purpose to educate the children are not residents.
(6)

Children living in hones that are not licensed

are not residents.
(0)

The fact that an orphanage pays or dees not pay

taxes has no bearing on the case.
(7)

Children placed in boarding homes for the purpose

of talcing advantage of educational facilities are not resi
dents.
(8)

The length of the residence in a district has no

bearing on the case.
(9)

The statutes relating to free public schools

should be liberally construed.
(10) Guardianship to be valid must be permanent and
parental.
(11) Arrangements for the care of children must be
judged by the visual foots and not b y the possible secret
mental Intentions.
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(13)
parental and
(15)

Guardianship that l® penal and temporary Is not

permanent.
Ohlldren may have residence other than with

their parents for sohool purposes.
(14)

The tost for school privileges Is not the same

as for the right of suffrage.
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CHAPTER 4
T0I7I0H AHD THE RESIDENT 3TUIERT
The constitutions of moat of the states declare that
the public schools of the state shall be free.
has not been Interpreted the same in all states.

The phrase
florae states

furnish transportation to the school and some furnish the
books that are used.

In general, it rmy be said that the

more recent a state has been admitted to the Tin!on the more
liberal are its school laws.
All of the courts of the state reports examined
agreed that tuition or the charge for instruction should be
free.

At first this only applied to the eight grades, but

with the universal acceptance of the high school, it also
has been included in the scope of the free public school.
The courts of Alabama in 1931 allowed a four dollar
matriculation fee to be charged.

The constitution of Ala

bama reads that the public schools shall provide liberal
public schools, so the courts held the school boards were
within their rights in charging this fee.

The four dollar

fa© in Lincoln was evidently held to be reasonable, for in
1910 the same court ruled that there was a well defined dis
tinction between tuition and an incidental fee, and in 1919
they ruled that such fee® could be charged but that they
must be reasonable.

Reasonable In this case was twenty-five

cents a month.
The Incidentel F e e .

By the incidental fee is meant
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that charge for suoh Items as wood and water for the school
building to assure the comfort of the children.

A rule In

force was that the children of indigent were erempt.
The courts hare made a distinotion between tuition
and the incidental fee for such purposes as heating, light
ing, etc.

This fact has been recognised by the Supreme

Court of Alabama.

In 1910, the Sourer** Court of Alabama

held that a charge of twenty-five cents a month for wood
end water was permissible by the County

Board.

The daughter

of Bryant1 wee refused instruction as she refused to pay this
fee.

The court held that the fee was reasonable, within the

power of the Board, her father was well able to pay, so the
fee oould be made a condition for admission to the sohool.
Rad her father been indigent, she would have been aroused.
Although incidental fees in Alabama are permissible,
2
the fee must be reasonable.
The Sohool Board of Coal City
made assessment against the pupils for amounts ranging from
fifty cents, seventy-five cents and one dol l a r , depending
on the grad© the child was in.

The payments were made the

condition for admittance to the sohool.

It was found that

a fee of twenty-five cents was sufficient for the item# al
lowed by law? that 1#, for wood, water, ©to.

The balance,

If any, was to be used to augment the teachers*

salaries.

In view of the fact that a fee of twenty-five cents was
^Bryant v":.T O e e n a n T ' "(l m ' O T i S T X i a . 336, 52 So 525.
R o b e r s o n v. Oliver (1919) 189 Ala. 438 . 66 So 695.

deeaed sufficient for the incidentals* It would appear that
the teacher*® salary wan kept in mind when the rate war wet.
Using a part of the Incidental fee for the teacher*s salary
made the fee In reality a tuition payment.

The Softool

Board ha® power to charge a reasonable amount for Incident
al fee®.

The amount charged in this case was more than

necessary for these incidentals.

This, coupled with the

fact that part of the fee wag to he used for tuition, made
the charge Illegal.

The School Beard*a plea that the money

received from the District was not sufficient to run the
school, while true, could have no weight in the Court*e
decision.

The fee had to be reasonable, which it wr® not,

the only point of interest to the Court*

In a similar case" , the School Board authorised the
teaoher to collect a one dollar fee per pupil per month.
The Court ruled, as in the other cas e , that a twenty-five
cents fee was sufficient for the Incidentals.

The Softool

Board ftad over-stepped its authority in allowing the
teacher to collect the dollar fee.

Admittedly, the salary

m m low and the Board was without resources to supplement
the pay in any other way.

The Softool would etill have to

be conducted according to law and the statutes.
Special Fe e s .

While tuition could not be charged In

Kentucky, it was felt that for subjects not included in the

^Hughes v. Outlaw (1916) 19? Ala. 463, 73 80 16
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regular course of study a special fee could be charged,4
The subjects were to be taught during the regular school
time and credit would be given.

The Courts ruled that the

ichool Board was within Its rights In authorising the teach
er to charge for this additional service.

tlon is a charge for instruction.

Schools that charge tui

tion or a fee for Instruction oannot be oalled free schools.
In the free public school, the payment of tuition falls on
the public in the form of taxes.

When this charge is met

In part by the public, the school must be classified as a
free public school.

That is, a school cannot be for a cart

of the year a public school and a private school for the re
mainder of the time.
In some states the support of the public schools has
not been strong.

All of the states have, at different times,

experienced difficulty in properly financing their schools
because of economic conditions.

At different times the

School Boards, often with the eonsent of the natrons, have
attempted to remedy the lack of support by regulations of
their own or by their own interpretation of the existing
statutes.

The constitutionality of laws passed for the ex

press purpose of charging tuition will not be dealt with
here, but the court cases on the attempts of School Boards
to take the initiative will be given.

4M&jox v . Oayee ( 1 8 9 5 ) 9 8 Ky.
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There were attempts to run the school® a© part time
public school© and part time private schools.

Some felt

that the approval of a majority of the patrons could author
ize the Board to charge tuition,

While it is true that a

school may operate on money from private sources as well a©
from public, it would not alter the fact that the school was
still a public school and tuition free.

If all patrons were

of the same mind and all willing to pay a tuition fee, a
school would be run aa a combination public and private
school, but such common consent would not moke it a legal
school.

Any one person could bring suit against such a

school if denied free admission and would be supported by
the courts.

The only way such a school could legally con

tinue , would be for the patrons so minded to make voluntary
contributions and allow those not so minded to attend free.
There is nothing to prevent an individual from giving money
to the school in addition to the tax he pays if he wishes
to do so, but the point is that no child eligible under the
state laws could be exoluded from a school supported in such
a manner, or admission be conditioned upon the payment of
tuition.
The point is illustrated by the case of Brinson v.
Jackson.®

The patrons of this school district demanded a

nine month school but there were funds sufficient only to
maintain the school for six months.

The plan formulated was

53rinson v. Jackson (1939) 168 O a . 353, 148 8E 98.

to charge a air dollar matriculation fee for the month© of
September, October end May.
for admittance to the school.

The fee wee wade a condition
The plaintiffs ashed for an

injunction to prevent the defendant from denying admittance
to the school.
The school was maintained in part toy funds provided
toy the AS,t.,P& AAIICTCiJLLL.JfAg.jLA.ff.li,

JLuJaaZl-

’Phis

fact stopped the defendants from denying that the school was
subject to the constitutional provision making the school
free to the children of the state.
Sarller in th© earns state a similar plan had been •
tried.

The plan was to run the school as a public school for

6
sir months, and the other thro as a private school.

During

these three months, the trustees mould have nothing to do
with the school, no tar money was to be used during this per
iod, the same staff of teachers would continue, and the school
would be held in the regular school building.

The decision

bended down by the Supreme Court of Georgia was that "a
school whose existence depends upon antecedent action by the
school officers and which could not be taught except by the
use of a .school house exclusively by law for the purpose of
education must be considered a public school and a fee cannot
be charged".

If the school had been in some rented hall and

none of the public school equipment used, it would have been

°Claxton v. Stanford (1925) 180 0®. 753, 188 SB 881.
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perfectly legal.

m\

fflfl .fiflafafll- Management

end control cannot be construed to give any powers beyond
their ordinary meaning, nor include the right to charge tui
tion

?

In

a school District in South Carolina, additional

money was needed to run the school properly.
decided they had the power to charge tuition

The trustees

m

the state Act

of 1896, section 32, gave them the power to manage and con
trol the School District.

The Court held that the right to

nonage end control the district did not include the right to
charge ttiition.

Charging tuition did not come under ordin

ary meaning of the phrase, and they had no power to interpret
the Act in that way.*
7
Or-pfrlnn..-of .CretHtg. C3
tlon.

A School District that had m d e

the payment of tuition

the condition for the admittance to the school had permitted
o
a girl to enter on condition that the tuition be paid later.
The girl the next year transferred to a different school and
asfced that her credits be transferred to the n ew school.

The

transfer was denied as she had not paid the tuition demanded
in the first school.

The Court held that the credits could

not be withheld as the tuition charged was illegal,

LmtemZmte .
7

*h ® liability of the School

T

.... r '"T'r

'
v‘

Young v. Trustees of Fountain Inn eroded School
(1897) 84 30 131, 41 8K 834.
^Roberts ▼. Wilson (1927) 397

m

419.
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District ©;ids when the four year high school course has been
finished.9

the children in this case had completed a four

year course in an approved school.

The father then sent them

to a different school for additional courses and ashed hie
district, which did not maintain a high school, to pay the
tuition.

The father held that as long as the home district

did not maintain a high school in the district, they ware
liable for high school subjects taken elsewhere,

the ruling

was that the district is only liable until a four year
course has bean completed, and not as long as setae one may
wish to go.
the 82 .se ruling is applied to students who have fin
ished a prescribed course and wish to return for additional
work.

The Board is within its rights in such cases to

charge tuition, but it is not mandatory,
ilrlVAtb. .amL-^flatarlaa Johoola.

The high school of

today is of comparatively recent development.

Before its

development, secondary education was in a large measure
taken care of by the academy.

These academies were private

schools organized by individuals or in many oases, by church
es.

The difference between a private school and a sectarian

on© is that a private school is very similar to a public one
except that it is osmed and controlled by private individuals.
The sectarian school is owned and controlled by a church,
,

% e w Hampton Institution v, Northwooa School District

(190?) 68 A 538.

with the instruction of religion playing on important part.
Before the development of the high school, it was
customary for the school districts to make arrangements with
the academies in the district to send their high school stu
dents to the academies for the school work.

Where there is

not a state statute to the contrary, this may still be done.
Some states have laws limiting the legal arrangements
that school districts may make with non-public schools.
South Dakota such a law exists.10

In

The Pleasant Vale School

District Ho. 53 discontinued it® school.

According to the

law, they made provisions for the children to attend school
elsewhere.

Klebanja sent his children to St, Martin*a Acad

emy, a sectarian school in Rapid 0 1 ty.

The Board agreed to

pay the tuition, but the Chairman, Mr. Brewer, refused to
sign the warrant.

The Chairman was upheld by the Court.

Dnder ^aaUan...T^.Saa^.^a,Uga..„7i^, ,CMv^..J2g.da.JLS12)» legal
arrangements could not be made with any non-public school.
St. Martin*s was not a public school, so arrangements for
the payment of tuition from Hlebanja* s school district could
not be made.
Private schools that accept public funds are classi
fied as public schools.

The revenue that an academy re

ceives comes mainly from the tuition charged, a right they
have.

However, If the academy accepts public funds for a

l0Hlebanja v . B r e w e r ( l 9 3 1 )

338 I* 296.
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"common school department" it come a under the common school
ll
laws.
In the case of 111 son. v.„ .Stanford. the Onion Baptist
Institute accepted public money for a common school depart
ment.

The patrons of the school district held that they did

not hare to pay the matriculation fee because of this.

The

Court ruled that a private school accepting public money
would come under the public school laws of the state, and as
s u c h . could not charge tuition to the residents of the dis
trict,

If the money received was net sufficient, they could

refuse to make such arrangements.
Model Schools.

The

model schools referred to in this

study are those schools that are connected with the State
Universities, Teachere Colleges, and normal Schools.

The

purpose of these schools is to provide a practical training
for the teachers being trained in the state schools.
The state schools of higher learning are almost al
ways located in cities that maintain schools of their own.
Some of the students may come from the outlying districts
end the tuition is paid by

these districts according to law.

The dispute is not over these children, but those from the
oity district.
The majority of the students of the model schools have
been from the school district of the local schools.

The

question is, whether or not the model school may charge the
local eohool district tuition for the students attending the
U W i l e o n T T W n F o V a .(T§a$y"TS! Oa.483 , 06 SE 358.
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model school.
The school districts hare maintained that they have
already established a school that renders the service re
quired by law.

It is not necessary for the students to at

tend the model school, as the school district has established
qualified schools in the district.

It is permissible for

the children of the district to attend the model school, but
if they do, no tuition should be charged.

In fact, tuition

oannot be charged, as the model school is a publio school
established by the state.

The state is charged by law with

providing a free education for all children of school ago.
Therefore, this state school for those of school age should
be free.
It has been held that for a school to be free, it
must be under the direction and o a trol of officers establiehed for that purpose.

12

The city schools are tinder the

control of the Board of Eduoation created by the state for
that purpose, and so are charged with providing a free edu
cation for the children of school age in the district,

On

the other hand, the model sohool is under the control of
the officials of the college, which is not a free publio
sohool.
In North Dakota, a law was passed to permit model
schools to charge tuition for students in attendance.
Court held the law to be constitutional.

The

The Court ©aln-

iaState Teachers College v. Morris (1933) 144 90 374.

tainsd that the city school district received benefits from,
the model school even though they maintained their own
schools.

It was possible for them to properly maintain

their schools with fewer teachers, removed the possibility
of having to build new schools, etc.

The legislature was

within its power when it charged a reasonable rate for the
facilities afforded the pupils of the special school dis
trict.*3
Any redress the special school district might have
would not be with the courts, they would have to go to the
legislature and remedy the situation by law.1
14
3
Summary of Points in haw of Chapter 4
(1)

In some states an Incidental fee for heating

and lighting may be charged, but the fee must be reasonable.
(2)

The right to control and regulate the district

does not include the right to charge tuition.
(3)

The consent of the majority of patrons in a

district does not legalise the oharging of tuition.
(4)

Tuition way be charged for subjects not in the

regular coarse of study.
< 5)

Tuition is only free until the four year high

school course has been completed.
(»)

Schools conducted in public school buildings are

13State v. Valley 01
~ 404,
' t a -----•—
(1919) 4 “|v^y D
173 HP' 760
Ibid
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free schools.
(?)

Schools cannot be conducted ea part time free

schools and part time private schools,
(8)

Credits cannot be withheld upon the non-payment

of tuition.
(9)

Private schools accepting public funds are

classified as public schools.
(10) Xn some states * such ae South Dakota, legal
arrangements cannot be made with non-public schools.
(11) Model schools may charge tuition for children
attending from local school districts.

4**4**1

OHAPTKR 5
TUTTIOH ASD K0K-RS3IDKNT flTHDRNTa
The school districts of a state are bound by law to
provide a free education for all children of rohool age,
otherwise eligible, who are residents of the school district.
This does not scan that each school district must provide
the physical equipment to furnish enoh an education.

If such

equipment is not furnished, the law requires that some ar
rangement must be made to furnish the education required by
law.
The usual arrangement, in case the local district
does not provide facilities, is to arrange with some other
district to educate the children, paying tuition for such
services.

It has been well established that a district le

not liable for the education of a child from another dis
trict, they are responsible only for the children of their
own dletriot.
pay tuition.

Children attending from another district must
By this, it is not meant that the children or

their parents must pay, but that the district charged with
the responsibility of the education oust.

In some states,

the tuition it paid by the state, at least in part.
lAfthUlte..s01atal.g.lui,., to, ..XuA.1t1L.flaa•

The fact that &

district has never maintained or authorised a high school
does not mean that their obligation ends there.

High schools

are now considered a part of the free public school system.
The very fact that a dletriot does not maintain a

high school

in

sufficient reason to attend a high school

elsewhere.12 The state law in this case imposed a quasi con
tract or obligation upon the School District,

Edna Simonson

had finished the eighth grade in her home district imd then
attended high school in Yankton.

She wished to oolleot tui

tion fro® hex district, an they did not maintain a high
school.

The district did not allow the payment m

they held

they were not liable, as a high school had newer been author
ised in the district.

Edna, to attend a high school, which

was her right, had to attend elsewhere; the proper procedure
had been followed in applying for tuition, so the dietriot
wae liable.
The obligation of a school district to provide educa
tion implies that the education must be provided when the
eligible children are ready for It.

Educational facilities,

for example, cannot be denied the children until the home
district is ready to provide them.

In the case of F i s h y .

liuntlm ton^. Fisk had followed the proper procedure in ap
plying for tuition for his children.

Huntington, having no

high school of their own, was required to make some arrange*
*aent for euoh

m

education.

The request for tuition was ap

parently refused for no other reason than that the next year
Huntington would have their own high school.

They felt that

the children of Fisk could wait a year to continue their
»

1Board of Education of the City o f Y a n k t o n , School Dis
trict Ho. 19 (1909) 33 3. D. 439, 133 H» 411.
2Fisk v. Inhabitants of the Town of Huntington, 179
Miss. g7 l , 61 HE 200

education.

The fact that the school district refused the

request for tuition that had been made with the proper pro
cedure taade the school district liable.

"The failure of s

town to grant a proper request la sufficient refusal to ren
der the town liable for tuition.

The law is constitutional

so long as the money is expended by the authorities of the
town or city in which the money ie to be expended."
Generally speaking, children are given the option of
attending the most convenient school.

Distance by the main

traveled roads being the criteria by which this point ie
established.

This is not always the point, however, where

the case is that of whether or not a home district offers a
3
four year hi#t school.
In the case of
Garter sent his children to a high school in Stuart, which
was two miles away.

Garter paid the tuition one year, but

after that expected his district to pay the tuition under
the statutes of Chapter 146 of the 34th,

General assembly,

which states that a district not offering a four year high
school, should pay the tuition.
The home district did not maintain a high school, but
a County high school was organised in the county where the
district was located.

It was held that, although the Guth

rie County High School was thirteen miles away, It mad© the
Long Branch District a school corporation offering a four
.
^Board o? Education, Diet. Ho. 7 v. School Dist. Bo.
66 (1914) 301 111. App. 439.

year high school course and b o h o b not liable for the tuition.
„,9h.T r ^ s f g x ,pX „9k?.tz&.ta•
Although districts are liable for tuition where they do not
provide the necessary facilities, it does not m e m that they
have no voice in the natter of tuition oayraont.

The dis

tricts must be ashed, and approve the transaction.

Refusal,

as has been seen, may make them liable, but at least they
must be consulted on the matter.

In the case of the Board
4

, 3 ? l a ,ju T&hwlU&rtxXQtM>.> the
parents of five ohlldren of District Seven consulted the
Directors of District 66 about their ohlldren attending
school in District

S3.

The transect ion was agreed to, but

the Directors of Ho. 7 were not informed.

The tuition could

not be recovered as the home directors had not boon asked to
approve the eohool selected by the parents In accordance with
aas^.iigXfc-2iU.JL215* JfoaaJtel .123 »■

Jgft»

I* the direct

ors had been consulted, the school selected being the logic
al one, the refusal of the Directors of District Ho, 7 would
not have released them from their liability.
The last point mentioned is further illustrated by the
case of

«6

The pupile of Wolcott, the

boo® district, were attending school in Hardwick.

One day

a director of Hardwick met a director from Woloott and told
.
♦Board o f Eduoation Ho. ^ v. School Diet. Ho, 36
(1914) 301 111. App. 439.
____ . flown Diet, of Hardwick v. Town Diet, of Wolcott,
(1906) 76 v*. 33, 61 A. 471.

him that they could no longer educate the children of the
Wolcott district at the same tuition.

Kothing more was done

and the children continued in the Hardwick school with the
knowledge of the foloott directors.

Tb& Hardwick directors

relied upon this knowledge, and the information given them,
to collect the tuition.
the tuition.

The .Voloott District was held for

They had been approached for their approval,

had failed to designate a different school and allowed the
continued attendance of the children.

Here the negative

action was sufficient to ocoiee their liability.
flamandlna Tuition.

The word, demand, In the lavs

governing tuition have been held to mean "to make applies*

6
tion*.

The tuition cannot be forced under any conditions,

but the regular procedure must be followed.

In this case, the

children of lire. Riley, residing in Clarendon, wished to go
to the Wallingford school, which was more conveniently lo*
cated.

The Clarendon directors argued, stating the money paid

should be considered transportation.
ley the practice would have to end.

Late; they told Krs. Ri*
The Town of Wallingford

attempted to collect tuition on the gounds of an implied
contract, and the knowledge of the Clarendon Board that the
children were attending the Wallingford school.
The Clarendon school had acted within their rights
in refusing to pay the tuition.

©

To demand tuition meant

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

_ _ Town of V alUngford v. Town of Clarendon (1908) 81
Vt. 845, 39 A. 734.

that aii application for tuition m a t bo r.iade.

The tuition

could not be collected after the notice bad been sent to
wire. Riley.

In this ©a*©, tfee Clarendon Board had taken

action, and being within their righto, the notice was valid*
Similar bourses*

The word *•similar* has been held

to uean to bear resemblenoe, but not completely identical.

7

The importance of this word is based on the e&re where a
school Board refused to pay tuition in another district as
they maintained a similar course.

Had the word si..ilar

meant having characteristics in common, like in fora, sire,
appearance, quality, and not merely bearing resemblance, the
home district would have been compelled to pay the tuition,
The Bounty Superintendent had assigned the students to tbs
Rose Township School, but the fnot that the home district
maintained a *similar" course, exempted that: from tuition
payments.*
v
,fak..Ati]dftttaas&.

Districts may

have to pay tuition for their resident children la other
districts, providing their schools are not more conveniently
located.

Ho set rule has been established a© to Just what

makes for a convenient school.

In a sparsely settled dis

trict, the most convenient may be fifteen miles away.

In

thickly settled districts, the matter of a few miles way be
the deciding point.

The rule that ie followed in determin-

vBoard of 'x&teation of Hose 'Towaa&lo v. Board of Ed
ucation of Silvercreek Township (1931) 440 Ohio, Aop. 335,
188, HIE 307.
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ing the most convenient school in to choose the meartst rublio route.

Factor? such as crossing railroad traobe, vo o r

roads, dangerous cross roads,

t o . , nay enter In, toot thee©

arc factors for the fhtpeyintendent of the County

to

decide.

The general rule is the nearest public maintalned highway.

A resident of a school district being more conven
iently located to a school In another district wa y have the
t tiltIon for hla children paid for in that district by the
i

home district.
In the once of .Bed:

8

v. Iron. Book

lived air and one

half mile* from the school In the home county, and seven
miles from the adjoining county.

His m m

school in the adjoining county of dal dwell.

were sent to the
Caldwell

sued

Bach for tuition of hi a two eons attending their school.
Beet maintained that the liability was that of hie home
County, Lyons.

He gave notice to the Lyons County authori

ties of his desire to send his m t m to the Caldwell school
but this plea, was denied.

He then Instituted action to

force the payment.
The Lyon County Board had to pay the tuition, as it

m.@ held that the Caldwell school was the more convenient,
because of conditions of the roads to the Lyons school.
ever,

on

How

the principle of having a voice In the matter, they

did not have to pay until after the notice had been given.

BBeck v. Lyon <1933) 31? Ky. 67, 388 3W 1012.
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tuition due a district educating non-resident children dif
fers In different state®.

Of the ceres found and examined

there was little uniformity In the decisions.

The courts all

agreed that the district educating non-resident students
should not be expected to pay for extending* such services.
The difference in the findings
services.

mm

who should pay for such

The court of the State of Iowa held that the par

ents could be made to nay the difference between the tuition
paid and the instructional costs.

The H e b m o k a court held

that where the costs were different, the district could re
fuse to admit students, but if they did not, extra charge
could be made.

Oregon and Indiana agreed that the hone dis

trict should be held liable for the difference in cost.
9
In the Iowa cnee, Mabel and Florence Chambers resid
ed in Calhoun Township where no hi^h school was

mlntvlnod.

They attended fci^h school in Missouri Valley and were charged
seven dollars tuition.

The hone district jm$& eight dollars,

making a total tuition of fifteen dollars.

The parents ob

jected to paying the seven dollare on the ground© that
ShS2tfi£.2 fiiL-ASlflJlC..!&£.,

LlSGMl&Z

limited the

amount that one district could charge another, end also that
it prohibited then from charging the parents.
The court held that the state legislature did not in
tend that non-resident children should pay lees tuition than

C h a m b e r s v. Everett (1931) 191 lows 49, 181 »W 86V.

resident children.

They felt that school beards would re-

file© to accent children uni© a* the difference in tuition

mr

equalised.

The ruling

mw

that non-resident students

could be charged tuition in addition to what thoir district
ra i d .
The Kebrasha case5-0 ruled that neither the hone dis
trict nor the parent or guardian could be charged with the
additional tuition.

The State Legislature had authorised

one dollar m d fifty cento weekly
hone district.

tuition to be

>ald by the

Dan Baldwin, from dietriot Be. 73, attended

school in Hebron and hi® home dietriot paid the one dollar
and fifty cento prescribed in the lav/.

After a time, the

Hebron school asked ran additional one dollar and fifty cents
from Ban Baldwin.
The Ckmrfc ruled that under certain conditions a
school district c m

refuse admittance to non-recident stu

dents, but if they do admit them all they can receive is
the one dollar and fifty cent© allowed by law.
Tlie Hebron school maintained a standard in excess of
that required by the High School Manual and so could not ex
pect other districts to help maintain that standard.

On

this p o i n t , the HebresVn Court seemed to stand alone.
11
The Indiana Court
ruled entirely different or: the
point as to who should pay the tuition.

_

The Ferry school

^‘
p Baldwin v . Dorsey (l9B3) 108 Hebr. 134, IB? JTO 879.
__ _ ^ « r r v. Perry School Township (1S04) 103 Ind. 310,

tCf iPMKw

»
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operates five months, the Bloomington school operates nine

Months.
liable

The P e r r y School Board
to

the

maintained

Bloomington District

for

that they were

fire months tuition,

which wa* ell the students untild hare received in the horse

district.

The

court

ruled "that shore a student transfers

frosts on© district to another where the terra is longer, the
tuition payable to the creditor district is not limited by
the tens of the resident district*.

Here the court ruling

would not penalise a district for maintaining a higher
standard than a neighboring district, not would they be ex
pected to bear a part of the cost for education for non
resident students.
The Oregon Court in 1933, followed the same line of
reasoning as did the Indiana court.

In the ot.se of u^ith

v. .Barnard*^ the state legislature arbitrnrly set the tui
tion rate to bo paid to high school districts by non-resi
dent high school districts.

The Eugene High School, had a

dsily attendance of seven hundred.

Two hundred and twenty-

five of these were non-resident students.
cost per pupil was eighty-nine dollars.

The per capita
For the non-resi

dent students, Eugene received sixty dollars for the first
twenty, fifty dollars for the second twenty, and thirty-five
dollars for the remainder.
The cost of the high school for educating the two
hundred end twenty-five non-resident student© amounted to

X2Snith v . Barnard (1933) 21 P 3 n d 304

54
treaty thousand and twenty-five dollars.

For thie servi ce

they received eight thoue&md, sir hundred end seventy-five
doll are.

In addition to thin, the Xurene tar-payer had to

contribute a 1.86 mill levy to the fund that the eight
thousand, air hundred on <5 seven ty-flre doll ere came from.
It coat the City of Eugene over twelve thousand dollars to
educate the two hundred and twenty-five non-resident stu
dents.

The court ruled that the I»«r was unconstitutional

a® it pieced an uneourl burden cm the taxpayer of Eugene
and also deprived the district receiving* such student? of
the due process of law,
Summary of Points in him of Chapter 5
(1)

School districts are liable only for the* educa

tion of resident students.
(2)

The fact that a district has never approved a

high school does not relieve them from tuition liability.
(3)

A district not offering a four year high school

course is liable for tuition.
<4)

Educational facilities roust be provided when

the children are ready for them.
(5)

Refusal to grant a penalt to attend the school

in a different district m y

render the district liable for

tuition.
(6)

Convenience in attending school roust be con

sidered.
(7)

Directors of the hoa» district

rmot

be consulted

55
m

to what school shall he attended.
(S)

to demand tuition means to make application fox

tuition,
(8)

*Similar coursesH are course® alike hut not coa-

•plotely identical,
(10) Resident students are not expected to pay more
tuition than non-resident students*
(11) Placing the burden

of

education of non-resident

students on the home district is depriving the taxpayers of
the home district of due process of law.

CHAPTER 6
THE Q0H3TI TUTX ORAL! TY OF TOITIOH LAWS
In the study of the court cnees, it was found that
lavs permitting one district to educate it* children at the
expense of another district were not constitutional.

It

was found that when a state legislature passed a law set
ting a certain tuition limit that might be paid, the amount
many times was not sufficient to pay for the cost of edu
cating the non-resident students.

To permit such action

would allow an unequal burden of taxation and also deprive
the people of the non-resident district of due process of
law.
The question of constitutionality of the laws was not
whether or not it was constitutional to charge tuition.

The

right of the etate legislature to charge one district for
services performed in a n o & e r district is not questioned.
The tuition paid by one district to another is paid by pub11© money and so would not oonfliot with the theory of a
free public school system.
The question involved was the amount of tuition set
by the State Legislature.

The fact that tuition was charged

did not enter into the case.

The question was if the amount

set by the Legislature was legal, ahd if the amount would
have to be adhered to in oase it was not sufficient to cover
the cost® of the non-resident district.
The courts all agreed that the non-resident district
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should not hear the cost of educating the children from an
other district.

They did not all agree, however, as to who

should nay the difference.

Only the court of one state, that

of Iowa, held that the parents could he charged for the dif
ference.

One court held that it oould not he paid at all,

and that the non-resident district would have to refuse ad
mittance to non-resident students, and the rest held that
the

home

district could he charged for the balance.

The court oases to he examined in this chapter will
deal with those cases that permit the patrons of a district
to he charged tuition.
To he constitutional, laws passed hy the state legis
latures must he in harmony with the state eonetitutlon.

In

every oaae hut one, it was found that laws allowing the
charging of tuition conflicted with the state constitution.
Where the legislature is charged with the establishing of a
free public sohool system, tuition may not be charged.
exception was the state of Alabama.

The

The constitution of

Alabama establishes a liberal school system which allows the
charging of s matriculation fee.
Another point was established in the cases examined.
There was some doubt as to whether or not the high sohool
should bs included in the public school system.

The courts

held that the four year high sohool was a part of the free
publie school system,

A-Lib«rel Public,sohool System. When a constitution
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establishes a free or liberal school system, there Is a Ques
tion as to Just shat a free or liberal school system is.

The

final interpretation rests with the state Supreme Court.

The

Alabama supreme Court ruled that a liberal school system could
not allow the charging of a matriculation fee.

Under a free

school aystem, such a fee would not be permissible.
In the case of

JBfi&KL.a*.

Iftnadttfla-qjMaate1 . Vincent, the father of two children, re
fused to pay a four dollar matrimilatlon fee in the public
schools of Lincoln.

He refused to pay on the gvounds that

such & fee, although authorised by the Board, could not be
charged in a public school.
The court held that under a constitution that re
quired a liberal school system, details of management, in
cluding the charging of such fees may be left to the school
Board.

The opinion of Justice J. Sayre was as follows!

“The argument against the constitutional validity of the
section proceeds upon the hypothesis that the constitution
establishes a system of free public schools ------- It ie
quite evident that, if the framers of the constitution had
thought to impose upon the legislature the duty to establish
a system of free public schools they would have used Just
that w o rd*•
The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that a common school

^Vincent v. County Board of Education of Talladega
County (1931) 131 SO 893.
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system meant a free school system.

It seems doubtful that

the Alabama Court would have ruled the sane as the Kansas
Court In interpreting the word common.
iL.g.aima...£\!tb,n£.Sstml ,.sm^a.*

the case of m m l
3

fli-Sduflation .of. Pity of.Lawrence v....Disk , the Board of Edu
cation authorised Its superintendent to expel all students
who refused to pay a tuition fee of two dollars and fifty
cents per term.

The Board held they had the right to make

this charge under the laws of I&a?.,L£jSSiU..I 2QI«J3ia5).
This bill permitted a oity of the second class to operate a
high school end maintain it In whole or in part by fees.
The oltisens objected to this payment as unconstitutional.
The Court held that to charge suoh a fee was unconstitution
al as it violated that section of the constitution calling
for a common school system.

Justice J. Greene* s opinion in

upholding the decision was as follows*

“It must be assumed

that the men who wrote the Constitution used the phrase "comlion school s’* in its technical sense, as we find it defined.
We think it follows therefore both from authority and reason
that the phrase "common schools* was used in the constitution
in Its technical sense, which means free schools, and that
the common schoola of Kansas are free*.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in ruling on this case,
interpreted the word "ootsmon" to mean free by following a

,
„ 3Board of Education of the City of Lawrence v. Dick
(1904) 70 Kan. 434, 78 P. 812.
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literal construction, on school laws.

Alabama ha© always

bom acre conservative on matter© pertaining to public edu
cation,

The Kansas court followed the wore liberal feeling

of the Berth and ‘Vest in its Interpretation,

A© the high school of today has become popular since many
state constitutions have teen adopted# it was necessary to
establish the principle of the free high school.
hi£h school by

The public

common concent of the people is considered

a part of the public

school system.

The fact that the peo

ple of a state give their enaction to sahing the high school
a part of the free public school system would not stake it a
legal part of the school system.

High schools could be main

tained in districts that m m willing to be tared for that
purpose# but the principle would have to be established by
the courts in the absence of any different law on the matter#
In 1919# the State Legislature of Arkansas authorised
the School Boards of the state to charge tuition to support
their high schools.

The School Board of Logan Comity decid

ed to take advantage of this a© they did not possess suf
ficient fund® to support their high school without the spec
ial foe,

A patron, Mr. Bangs, brought suit to prevent this

charge on the grounds that such a fee would be unconstitu
tional
***»—« '•mrnmutm
...... '
■«... HWMW
Logan County Board of Education v. Bangs (1930) 144
Ajfc. 34 221 m 1060.
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The court held that the special act was unconstitu
tional .

The ooraon schools included the high school which

meant that the high schools had to be free.

The fact that

the district was without sufficient funds to maintain a
high school could not make the law oonstitutional.

If the?

lacked the funda they- had the power to limit the schoole to
the lower grades.
«jggfflaU2R f l t , i m u a a .ijnarsmA•
parents are legal but not neoessary.

to

indigent

The charging of tuition

in those states that maintain a free public eobool system
is not legal, regardless of ability to pay or not.

In a

state such as Alabama, a law exempting indigent parents may
be necessary,
In the case of Peonies v. Moors4 a law had been passed
by the legislature exempting the patrons unable to pay but
charging the rest.

Thirteen children from the Soeelawn dis

trict were given permission to attend high school in the
Danville district.
to pay the tuition.

All of the parents except two were able
The Hoeelawn school Board paid the tui

tion for all thirteen children.

Later they started action

to recover tuition from the eleven that could afford to pay.
The action was based on the Act of May 35. 190? (Laws.ISO?,
o. 533) which stated that tuition shall be free only to
those whose parents or guardians cannot afford to pay.
P e o p l e V.' Moore (1909) 240 111. 408 , 88 NS 979.

The court ruled as the Legislature could only estab
lish free school® and the high school® being a part of the
public school system must also be free.

If the right of the

school® is extended to the pupil® of other districts, it
would hare to be on the same term® to all.

Therefor©, the

special not granting exemption® to some was unconstitutional.
The earn© ruling was applied in the case of Mercer
nmgB..,agtafll,

.Tqantihta «*»«*« » ruling

had been made exempting the children of the Veteran® of the
Civil tfar.
Summary of Point® in Law of Chapter 0
Cl)

The State Supreme Courts must decide if tuition

may be charged in the public school system of the state*
(2)

The high schools are accepted as a part of the

public school system.
(3)

The exemption of tuition must be made on the

sajrse basis to all.
(4)

State Legislature® may not pass law® granting the

right to charge tuition contrary to their state constitution.

63
mmumaa
The establishing of a public school system of the
United State®

h m hem.

left to the states*

neglected its children of school age,

Ho stmt® ha®

It Is true that the

children are not all equally taken oar® of; the school l a w
in all tIs® states are not equally liberal in providing an
education; m & it Is also equally true that mil states do
not have equal financial ability to provide sn educr.tion.
The state® mil recognise the need for & free public
school education of its youth in their constitutions.

These

constitutions ere not worded the same nor have they been In
terpreted the same by the different Supreme Courts of the
states.

They do, however, all establish a public school

system.

Any child of school mg® in the United States will
find sduamtlcfcal facilities provided for hiss at a© cost to
himself or parent® or guardians,
as hug® m

To •Mttistsr a hasinsss

the public school system, rules and regulations

are necessary.

There may be times when enforcing these

rules, there may seem to be a miscarriage of Justice and
one denied any opportunity for education,

ssmt

'then such situa

tion® arise, the recourse is the courts of the states and
the Supreme ©curt of the states

h m hem

liberal in their

construction of the school laws.
The various Supreme Courts of the state® have decided
that free public schools and common public schools are to
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b© free schools. Under the state constitutions, the legisla
ture® nay not authorize School Boards to charge tuition.
The state, through it® subdivision, the school district, is
held responsible for the education of the children of the
school district.

In fact, the states go so far m

Upon children up to a certain age attending school.

to insist
Only

after a certain age ha® been reached or certain attainment®
in school stranding® been made, doe® the responsibility of
the state end.
A problem of the future not touched upon by this study
is that problem created by a part of our mobile population.
Many people today are living in auto-trailers or tourist
camps.

The education of the children of these people will

doubtlessly create a problem that must be met in the near
future.

How tills problem will be m t should make an inter

esting study for some one.
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